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A frequent problem in practical applications of reasoning, even with just the basic propositional calculus, is that the
knowledge base is actually inconsistent, so that if one was permitted to use the full force of logical consequence it would
entail all sentences and so be useless for all practical purposes. On the other hand one’s knowledge base, even if formally
inconsistent, would normally contain potentially useful information, the problem being how to extract it whilst at the same
time avoiding the classical explosion associated with inconsistency.
Numerous methods have been proposed to solve this problem, for example fragmenting the knowledge base into max-
imally consistent subsets and looking at the common consequences of these, limiting the proof theory or adopting non-clas-
sical semantics (see [1,15] for surveys). Such a variety of approaches seems entirely appropriate here since one can envisage
different ways in which one might have acquired an inconsistent knowledge base, for example by receiving some entirely
erroneous information, by receiving information from different sources or by receiving information which has become cor-
rupted in transmission.
In this paper we shall consider an approach suiting the situation (amongst others) where the knowledge base consists of
the assertions made, or held, by a single rational agent, such as ourselves. In this context our pronounced knowledge fre-
quently does exhibit inconsistency at a formal level, a feature commonly exploited by lawyers when cross examining in a
court of law. Nevertheless, in our everyday lives this causes us little or no concern since under pressure we would maintain
not that our assertions were necessarily undeniable facts (though that might happen) but rather that we assigned them a
high, or at least reasonable, degree of belief, which for this paper we shall identify with subjective probability. A well-known
example of this is the so-called ‘Lottery Paradox’ where we believe that some ticket will win but of any particular individual
ticket that it will not win (see [9]).. All rights reserved.
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1152 J.B. Paris et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1151–1163This paper extends results in [11] and [13]. To recap the basic approach from those papers, we suppose that we have a
ﬁnite inconsistent knowledge base in some ﬁnite propositional language L. Whilst overall the knowledge base is inconsis-
tent in the simplest case we may have no reason to think that any one sentence from it is any more believable than any
other. What we can do in this case, and this seems to ﬁt in well with the way we treat inconsistent information in the real
world, is to give each sentence some lower bound ‘primary threshold probability’ g that it is true. Given that we have
accepted this threshold g it might then be argued that we should equally be willing to accept as consequences of our
knowledge base any other sentences which as a result must have (by probability logic, see for example [2,3] or [12]) prob-
ability at least some suitable secondary threshold f.
Of course the natural choice here might seem to be g, that is treating the believability requirement for the conse-
quences only as rigorously as that for the initial pieces of knowledge. That was the approach taken in [11] (which we refer
to for further background). However we might consider setting higher demands on the consequences, that is taking f > g,
or lower, or even measuring the relative believability of a consequence by the maximum f which can be sustained. This
approach was mentioned very brieﬂy in [11] and will be considered in detail in this paper.
The method of information extraction, or reasoning, from (possibly) inconsistent knowledge bases that we are propos-
ing here has the advantage that it treats all the items in the knowledge base equally. At the same time by varying the
choice of thresholds it allows one to provide graded beliefs. Indeed we will all along be arranging our notation with
the idea that the primary threshold g is a variable whose value the user is free to adjust. Of course this method does
not entirely do away with inconsistency, if the initial g is chosen too large then the resulting knowledge even within prob-
ability logic may be inconsistent. On the other hand the range of g for which we do have consistency within probability
logic itself gives information about the initial knowledge base, as Knight describes in [6,7].2. Notation and deﬁnitions
We shall work in a ﬁnite (but varying) propositional language L, denoting its propositional variables by p1; . . . ; pl or
p; q; r . . . in speciﬁc examples. We will denote its corresponding set of sentences by SL (boolean combinations of our primitive
propositions in L) and its corresponding set of atoms by AtL. Recall that by atoms (see, for example [12]) we mean sentences
of the formp1 ^    ^ pl
where þpi and pi stand for pi and :pi, respectively.
Let w : SL! ½0;1. We say that w is a probability function on L if these two conditions hold for all h;/ 2 SL:
(P1) If  h then wðhÞ ¼ 1.
(P2) If  :ðh ^ /Þ then wðh _ /Þ ¼ wðhÞ þwð/Þ.
From (P1–2) all the standard properties of probability functions follow, for example that for general h and /,wðh _ /Þ ¼ wðhÞ þwð/Þ wðh ^ /Þ
and if h  / then wðhÞ 6 wð/Þ (for more details, see [12]). In particular recall that a probability function w is determined un-
iquely by its values on the atoms,hwða1Þ; . . . ;wða2l Þi 2 hx1; . . . ; x2l ijxi P 0;
X
i
xi ¼ 1
( )via the identitieswðhÞ ¼
X
ah
wðaÞ:For g 2 ½0;1 and C (here and throughout) a ﬁnite subset of SLwe say (following Knight in [6,7] and [8]) that C is g-consistent
if there is some probability functionw on L such thatwð/ÞP g for all / 2 C, in shortwðCÞP g. We say that C ismaximally g-
consistent, denoted mcðCÞ ¼ g, if g is maximal such that C is g-consistent. As shown in [7] there is such a maximal g 2 Q (the
set of rationals).
Following [11] and [17] we deﬁne for g; f 2 ½0;1,Cg.fh() for all probability functions w on L;
if wðCÞP g then wðhÞP f:In the following two sections we will derive some basic properties of g.f and in the section following these we will provide an
equivalent formulation entirely within the framework of the propositional calculus. This task will be completed in the ﬁnal
chapter when we shall consider the functional relationship between the thresholds imposed on the assumptions and those
consequently applying to the conclusions.
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In this case mcðCÞ ¼ 1=3 and if we are willing to assign belief (i.e. subjective probability) at least 1/3 to each of these sen-
tences in C being true then individually each of p, q and r will be true with probability at least 2/3, that is C1=3.2=3p; q; r. Thus
if we had set 2/3 as the threshold for which we were willing to accept conclusions from this set Cwe would accept p, q and r
(but not in fact r ^ q since C1=37
2=3
r ^ q). This seems to us a more satisfactory conclusion (in this context) than what is prob-
ably the currently most popular system, of Rescher and Manor [16], where only conclusions of all maximal consistent sub-
sets are accepted.
Of course one may argue that the Rescher and Manor approach at least yields a wholly consistent set of conclusions
whereas even with a threshold f > 1=2 the sentences inferred via g.f from C may be inconsistent when taken as a whole,
indeed they are in the above example when f ¼ 2=3 since C1=3.2=3p; q;:p _ :q. In response we would aver that our aim is
different from theirs, we are not aiming to produce a consistent set of conclusions but rather to produce a set of conclusions
each of which is believable to some threshold degree given the assumed credibility of the original knowledge base. This
seems to us closer to what is required in the case of a fallible agent (such as ourselves) assigning beliefs. The agent is not
in general looking to discard knowledge in order to become internally consistent but rather to draw conclusions with a guar-
anteed acceptable probability.
Having said that, provided g 6 mcðCÞ we can ensure the classical consistency, and even closure under logical conse-
quence, of the set of conclusions h such that Cg.fh by setting f sufﬁciently large, certainly f ¼ 1 will do (see Proposition 1(v)).
Over the following three sections of this paper we investigate some aspects of the relation g.f pertinent to the above
intention. For example its behavior at extreme values of g; f (Proposition 1), its invariance with respect to the underlying
language (Theorem 5) and the way the maximal f such that Cg.fh varies as a function of g (Propositions 2, 4, Theorems 8,
11, Corollary 9). Finally in Section 6 we give a further ‘real world’ example (to which the reader who desires further moti-
vation may already turn).
3. Properties of g.f
In this section we give a number of simple properties of the relation g.f. Our ﬁrst proposition just classiﬁes g.f at some key
extreme values of g; f.
Proposition 1. For any C and h,
(i) For all g;Cg.0h.
(ii) For f > 0;C1.fh() C  h.
(iii) For g > mcðCÞ;Cg.1h.
(iv) For f > 0;C0.fh()  h.
(v) For g 6 mcðCÞ; fhjCg.1hg is consistent and closed under logical consequence.
Proof. Parts (i) and (iii) are immediate from the deﬁnition of g.f. If C is inconsistent then (ii) follows trivially. Otherwise,
notice that, since standard valuations V on L mapping into f0;1g are probability functions, if C1.fh then VðhÞP f for all val-
uations V. But since f > 0 the only possibility here is for VðhÞ ¼ 1, so C  h. Conversely suppose C  h and wðCÞ ¼ 1. Then for
any atom a, if wðaÞ > 0 then a  / for every / 2 C, otherwisewð/Þ ¼
X
a/
wðaÞ < 1so a  VC. Hence, since VC  h,
f 6 1 ¼
X
a
V
C
wðaÞ ¼ w
^
C
 
6 wðhÞas required.
For (iv), if it is not the case that  h then there is some valuation V such that VðhÞ ¼ 0 and so since V is also a probability
function C0.fhmust also fail when f > 0. Conversely if C0.fh fails then there must be some probability function w such that
wðhÞ < f 6 1. Hence 2h by (P1).
Final (v) follows immediately since for w a probability function the set of sentences to which w gives probability 1 is
closed under conjunctions and logical consequence and cannot contain a contradiction since that would have to have
probability zero. (We shall later improve this result in Proposition 7.) h
In particular, with regard to part (v) above, in the case of C as in (1) and g ¼ mcðCÞ ¼ 1=3,fhjCg.1hg ¼ fhj
^
C  hg ¼ fhjðp ^ qÞ _ ðp ^ rÞ _ ðq ^ rÞ  hg
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important consideration in the context of setting thresholds.
Proposition 2. Assume that Cg.fh.
(i) If sP g; m 6 f then Cs.mh.
(ii) If sP 0; f > 0 and gþ s; fþ s 6 1 then CðgþsÞ.ðfþsÞh.
Proof. (i) Follows trivially from the deﬁnition of g.f. We omit the proof of (ii) since it is a straightforward adaptation of a
similar result for g.g in [11] (and furthermore Corollary 9 in Section 5 will improve on it). h
Our next proposition gives us some right and left weakening properties of our consequence relation g.f, both of which
follow directly from the deﬁnition.
Proposition 3. Assume that Cg.fh. Then for w 2 SL:
(i) C [ fwgg.fh.
(ii) If h  w then Cg.fw.
The following result demonstrates a closure property of the pairs hg; fi such that Cg.fh.
Proposition 4. If limn!1gn ¼ g; limn!1fn ¼ f with the gn increasing and Cgn.fnh for all n then Cg.fh.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that under these assumptions Cg.fh failed, say wðCÞP g but wðhÞ < f for some probability
function w. Then for some n wðhÞ < fn so Cgn7
fn
h since gn 6 g, contradiction. h
We now show that g.f does not depend on the particular overlying language L that is chosen. More precisely:
Theorem 5. The relation g.f is language invariant in the sense that if L1; L2 are ﬁnite propositional languages such that
C# SL1 \ SL2, h 2 SL1 \ SL2 then w1ðhÞP f for every probability function w1 on L1 such that w1ðCÞP g if and only if w2ðhÞP f
for every probability function w2 on L2 such that w2ðCÞP g.
Proof. Assume that C# SL; h 2 SL and that Cg.fh in the context of the language L, in other words for all probability functions
w on L if wðCÞP g then wðhÞP f. It is enough to show that if L0 is the language obtained from L by adding a single new prop-
ositional variable p then for any probability function w0 on L0 if w0ðCÞP g then w0ðhÞP f, and conversely.
In the forward direction suppose thatw0 is a probability function on L0 such thatw0ðCÞP g butw0ðhÞ < f. Then letw be the
restriction (or marginalization) of w0 to SL. The w is clearly again a probability function which agrees with w0 on C and h and
so Cg.fh fails in the sense of L.
Conversely suppose w is a probability function on L such thatwðCÞP g butwðhÞ < f. Notice that the atoms of L0 are of the
form a ^ p;a ^ :p where a is an atom of L. Deﬁne w0 on the atoms L0 by w0ða ^ pÞ ¼ wðaÞ;w0ða ^ :pÞ ¼ 0. Then for / a
sentence of Lwð/Þ ¼
X
a/
wðaÞ ¼
X
a/
w0ða ^ pÞ þw0ða ^ :pÞ ¼
X
b/
w0ðbÞ ¼ w0ð/Þwhere the b range over the atoms of L0, since for / a sentence of L,a  / () a ^ p  / () a ^ :p  /
Hence Cg.fh also fails in the context of language L0. h
Because of this proposition we can assume that the overlying language is in fact potentially inﬁnite. It is just that at any
one time we are restricting ourselves to some ﬁnite sublanguage. This is very convenient because probability functions are
easier to deal with in this case, though it could certainly be dispensed without changing any of the results.
Since, as we have seen, g.f becomes simply classical logical consequence when g ¼ 1; f > 0 it is natural to ask if in fact
the consequence relation g.f might also have an equivalent formulation entirely within the classical propositional calculus
for other values of g and f. In the following section we shall give a proof that this is indeed the case for rational g; f. In the
section following that we shall extend the proof of this equivalence to the irrational case(s) and give a rather more detailed
picture of the relationship between the pairs hg; fi for which Cg.fh holds.
4. An equivalent of g.f within propositional logic
As in [11] and [17] we give a derivation of the required equivalence via an extended discussion. This result is not new, it is
a consequence of results by Gerla in [3], and, independently and somewhat later, by Heifetz and Mongin in [5]. Nevertheless
for the sake of self-containedness and because we will be developing notation at the same time we include a sketch proof.
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either of these is zero we trivially have a suitable equivalent version by Proposition 1. So suppose thath1; . . . ; hn
c=d.e=f/ ð2Þand for the present that / is not a tautology. Let b1; . . . ; bm enumerate the satisﬁable sentences of the formh1 ^    ^ hn
where þhi and hi stand for hi and :hi, respectively. Let ~hi be that m-vector with jth coordinate 1 if bj  hi and 0 otherwise
(i.e. in case bj  :hi) and let ~/ be the m-vector with jth coordinate 1 if bj  / and 0 otherwise.
Then condition (2) is equivalent toFor all ~x 2 Dm; if ~hi ~xP c=d for 1 6 i 6 n then ~/ ~xP e=f ð3Þ
whereDm ¼ fhx1; . . . ; xmijxi P 0;
X
i
xi ¼ 1gThis follows since for any probability function w,hwðb1Þ; . . . ;wðbmÞi 2 Dm
andwðhiÞ ¼
X
bjhi
wðbjÞ ¼ ~hi  hwðb1Þ; . . . ;wðbmÞiLet ~1 be the m-vector with 1’s at each coordinate and let~hi ¼ ~hi  ðc=dÞ~1; ~/ ¼ ~/ ðe=f Þ~1
Then (3) can be restated asFor all ~x 2 Dm; if ~hi ~xP 0 for 1 6 i 6 n then ~/ ~xP 0 ð4Þ
In turn this is equivalent by Farkas’ Lemma to the assertion that ~/ is in the cone in Qm (i.e. the m-vectors of rationals) given
byXn
i¼1
ai~hi þ
Xm
j¼1
bj~ujj 0 6 ai; bj 2 Q
( )where ~uj is them-vector with jth coordinate 1 and all other coordinates 0. In other words, it is equivalent to (4) that there are
some 0 6 ai 2 Q such that~/P
Xm
i¼1
ai~hi ð5ÞWritten in terms of a common denominator M let ai ¼ Ni=M where the M;Ni 2 N. Then (5) becomesMðdf~/ de~1ÞP
Xn
i¼1
Niðdf~hi  cf~1Þ ð6Þequivalently½Mdðf  eÞ þ cf
Xn
i¼1
Ni~1P Mdf ð~1~/Þ þ
Xn
i¼1
dfNi~hi ð7ÞConversely if (7) holds for some natural numbers M > 0, N1; . . . ;Nn P 0 then we can reverse this chain to get back (2).
Now let v1; . . . ;vN 2 fh1; . . . ; hng be such that amongst these v1; . . . ;vN the sentence hi appears exactly dfNi times for each
i ¼ 1; . . . ;n (so N ¼ dfPiNi). Then for br2/ it follows from (7) that the rth coordinate of ~vj is non-zero for at most
deM þ cfPiNi ¼ ðcN  d2eMÞ=d many j. Notice that because / is not a tautology there is at least one such r. Hence_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj>ðcNd2eMÞ=d
^
j2S
vj  / ð8ÞNotice that by the choice of N ðcN  d2eMÞ=d is an integer and indeed non-negative since / is not a tautology. Similarly if
br  / then it follows from (7) that the rth coordinate of ~vj is non-zero for at most Mdðf  eÞ þ cf
Pn
i¼1Ni ¼
ðcN þ d2Mðf  eÞÞ=d many j. Hence
3 In [
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S# f1;...;Ng
jSj>ðcNþd2MðfeÞÞ=d
^
j2S
vj ? ð9ÞNow letZ ¼ 1þ ðcN þ d2Mðf  eÞÞ=d
T ¼ 1þ ðcN  d2eMÞ=dso 1 6 T < Z andTdðf  eÞ ¼ fcN  edZ þ df
From (8) and (9) we have that_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼Z
^
j2S
vj ? ð10Þ
_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼T
^
j2S
vj  / ð11Þ
Tdðf  eÞ ¼ fcN  edZ þ df and T < Z ð12Þ
Conversely suppose that for some T; Z 2 N and v1; . . . ;vN (not necessarily those above) (10), (11) andTdðf  eÞ 6 fcN  edZ þ df and 1 6 T < Z ð13Þ
hold. Then for any atom a of L, if a  :/ then for at most T  1 many j can we have that a  vj. Similarly if a  / then there
can be at most Z  1 such j. Hence, using the earlier vector notation but now with the genuine atoms a1; . . . ;a2l replacing the
b’sXN
j¼1
~vj 6 ðT  1Þ~1þ ðZ  TÞ~/ ð14ÞNow suppose ~x 2 D2l and ~vj ~xP c=d for j ¼ 1; . . . ;N. Then dotting each side of (14) with ~x we obtain
ðZ  TÞ~/ ~xP ðc=dÞN  T þ 1But from (13) we have thatðc=dÞN  T þ 1
Z  T P e=fso ~/ ~xP e=f .
To sum up, if (10), (11), (13) hold thenv1; . . . ;vN
c=d.e=f/and by Proposition 3(i) (if necessary) we haveh1; . . . ; hn
c=d.e=f/Conversely ifh1; . . . ; hn
c=d.e=f/then there are sentences v1; . . . ;vN 2 C (possibly with repeats) such that for some Z; T (10), (11), (13) hold. [Indeed we can
even have equality in the ﬁrst inequality in (13) though for practical purposes it is very convenient to adopt the weaker
version.]
Taking g ¼ c=d; f ¼ e=f we now obtain the following propositional equivalent of g.f in the case when g; f are rational and
non-zero.3 We will complete the proof of this theorem for possibly irrational g; f at the end of the next section (which will as-
sume this theorem but only in the already proven rational case).
Theorem 6. Let g; f 2 ð0;1. Then for h1; . . . ; hn;/ 2 SL, h1; . . . ; hng.f/() 9v1; . . . ;vN 2 fh1; . . . ; hng ðpossibly
with repeatsÞ and T; Z 2 N such that11] a somewhat less amenable equivalent is given for the special case g ¼ f and the necessary side condition T < Z is not explicitly stated.
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S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼Z
^
j2S
vj ?
_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼T
^
j2S
vj  /In other words for these v1; . . . ;vN coming from amongst h1; . . . ; hn the conjunction of any Z of them is inconsistent whilst the con-
junction of any T of them implies /.
Proof. If / is a tautology then left to right follows by taking T ¼ N ¼ 0; Z ¼ 1. Conversely if the right-hand side holds with
T ¼ 0 then / must be a tautology. The bound of N þ 1 on Z is immediate and the rest of the proof follows by the discussion
preceding the theorem. h
Theorem 6 allows one to formulate and work with g.f entirely within the familiar framework of the propositional
calculus, though in practice the N can be at least almost exponentially larger than n, see [14]. Nevertheless in small
examples this does seem to be of some practical use, certainly so once one is willing to engage with classical proposi-
tional reasoning.
To give an idea of how this theorem works in practice considerC ¼ fp ^u; q ^u; r ^ug
where u ¼ :ðp ^ q ^ rÞ. In this case mcðCÞ ¼ 2=3 and C2=3.2=3p _ ðq ^ rÞ, as is veriﬁed by takingv1 ¼ v2 ¼ p ^u; v3 ¼ q ^u; v4 ¼ r ^u
and N ¼ Z ¼ 4; T ¼ 3 to satisfy the conditions (10), (11) and (13) with / ¼ p _ ðq ^ rÞ.
In the following section we turn our attention to considering the best f, as a function of g, such that Cg.fh for given C; h.
5. The function FC;h
For C# SL; h 2 SL and g 2 ½0;1 deﬁne
FC;hðgÞ ¼ supff 2 ½0;1jCg.fhgNotice that by Proposition 1(i) this supremum is certainly well deﬁned. Furthermore by Proposition 4 this supremum is actu-
ally attained, that is if FC;hðgÞ ¼ c then Cg.ch, and moreover unless g > mcðCÞ there must be some probability function w
such that wðCÞP g and wðhÞ ¼ c, otherwise c would not be the claimed maximum.
Armed with this deﬁnition we can now give the promised improvement of Proposition 1(v).
Proposition 7. Given g 6 mcðCÞ let
k ¼minfFC;:aðgÞja an atom of LgThen k < 1 and fhjCg.fhg is consistent if and only if k < fð6 1Þ.
Proof. If k ¼ 1 then
f:aja is an atom of Lg# fhjCg.1hgwould be consistent by Proposition 1(v), which it is not.
Similarly if f 6 k then fhjCg.fhg would contain :a for every atom a and so would not be consistent.
Conversely if f > k let atom a be such that k ¼ FC;:aðgÞ. Then if Cg.fh;a  h, otherwise h  :a so Cg.f:a, contradicting the
deﬁnition of k. It follows then that fhjCg.fhg is consistent. h
To take a simple example of the function FC;hðgÞ letC ¼ fp; q;:p ^ :qg
and h ¼ p ^ q. In this case mcðCÞ ¼ 1=2 andFC;hðgÞ ¼
0 for 0 6 g 6 1=3
3g 1 for 1=3 6 g 6 1=2
1 for 1=2 < g 6 1
8><
>:It turns out that this is a typical, albeit simple, example of what the graph of FC;h must look like, roughly a ﬁnite
number of increasingly steep straight sections followed by a ﬂat section at 1. Our next theorem spells this out
precisely.
1158 J.B. Paris et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1151–1163Theorem 8. The function FC;h is increasing and FC;hð0Þ; FC;hð1Þ 2 f0;1g. On the interval ½0;mcðCÞ the function FC;h is convex and
continuous and is made up of a ﬁnite number of straight line segments y ¼ q1xþ q2 with q1; q2 2 Q such that q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0 or
q1 ¼ 0; q2 ¼ 1 or q1 P 1 q2 P 1. On the interval ðmcðCÞ;1 FC;h has constant value 1.
Proof. That FC;h is increasing follows by Proposition 2(i). The fact that its value on 0 is either 0 or 1 follows from Proposition
1(iv), and the fact that its value on 1 is either 0 or 1 follows from Proposition 1(ii) and (i).
We now consider FC;h on the interval ½0;mcðCÞ. To show that FC;h is convex on here suppose that 0 6 g1 < g2 6 mcðCÞ
and 0 < l < 1. Pick probability functions w1;w2 such that w2ðCÞP g2 and w2ðhÞ ¼ FC;hðg2Þ and w1ðCÞP g1 and
w1ðhÞ ¼ FC;hðg1Þ. Let w be the probability function lw1 þ ð1 lÞw2. Then with the obvious notation that
wðCÞ ¼minfwð/Þj/ 2 Cg etc.,wðCÞP lw1ðCÞ þ ð1 lÞw2ðCÞP lg1 þ ð1 lÞg2
wðhÞ ¼ lFC;hðg1Þ þ ð1 lÞFC;hðg2ÞThen, as required,FC;hðlg1 þ ð1 lÞg2Þ 6 lFC;hðg1Þ þ ð1 lÞFC;hðg2Þ
Given now that FC;h is increasing and convex on ½0;mcðCÞ to show it is also continuous it sufﬁces by standard results on
convex functions, see for example [18], to show that for c ¼mcðCÞ, limx%cFC;hðxÞ ¼ FC;hðcÞ. By Proposition 4,
limx%cFC;hðxÞ 6 FC;hðcÞ. If strict inequality held here, saylim
x%c
FC;hðxÞ < k < FC;hðcÞthen we can ﬁnd increasing cn converging to c and probability functions wn such that wnðCÞP cn;wnðhÞ < k. Since the wn are
determined by their values on the ﬁxed ﬁnitely many atoms of L these wn must have a subsequence wkn with a limit, w say.
ThenwðCÞP lim
n!1
wkn ðCÞ ¼ cwhilstwðhÞ ¼ lim
n!1
wkn ðhÞ 6 k < FC;hðcÞwhich is the required contradiction.
To show that on ½0;mcðCÞ FC;h is made up of a ﬁnite number of straight line segments y ¼ q1xþ q2 notice that there is a
formula Wðx; yÞ of the language of the structure
R ¼ hR;þ;6;0;1isuch that for g; f 2 ½0;1,
R  Wðg; fÞ () FC;hðgÞ ¼ f:Since R is an elementary extension of the structureQ ¼ hQ;þ;6;0;1i
and its theory satisﬁes quantiﬁer elimination (see for example [10, Corollary 3.1.17]) and FC;h is continuous we can suppose
that Wðx; yÞ is of the form_h
i¼1
g^i
j¼1
ðmijy 6 nijxþ kijÞfor some mij;nij; kij 2 Z. The set of pairs hg; fi such thatR 
g^i
j¼1
ðmijy 6 nijxþ kijÞis a convex set so since FC;h is a function it must actually be a line segment, and with coefﬁcients q1; q2 in Q, over the closed
interval of ﬁrst coordinates of these pairs. We may further suppose that this closed interval is not composed of a single point,
otherwise it will simply be included in other intervals.
To see that these coefﬁcients q1; q2 have the required properties assume q1 > 0 (otherwise q2 2 f0;1g by what has already
been proved) and pick an interior rational point hg; fi on this line segment (so g; f < 1). By the already proven result for
rationals there exist such N; Z; T etc. for this pair. Notice that T P 1, otherwise  h and q1 ¼ 0; q2 ¼ 1, and T 6 N, otherwise
q1 ¼ q2 ¼ 0. So,ð1 fÞT 6 gN  fZ þ 1
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Z  T ð15ÞClearly we must have equality in (15) since otherwise we could increase f to some f0 and the rule would give Cg.f0h, con-
tradicting FC;hðgÞ ¼ f. But then this liney ¼ xN  T þ 1
Z  Tmust be the same as the line y ¼ q1xþ q2 on this interval so q1 ¼ N=ðZ  TÞ; q2 ¼ ð1 TÞ=ðZ  TÞ. Notice that Z 6 N þ 1 since
otherwise we could replace Z by N þ 1 without changing the required conditions and that would contradict the fact that
FC;hðgÞ ¼ f. The required inequalities q1 P 1 q2 P 1 follow.
This shows that FC;h has the required properties on ½0;mcðCÞ. The last part of the theorem follows directly from
Proposition 1(iii). h
We remark at this point that the function FC;h has previously been considered (in more generality) by Gerla in [4] since
when C is g-consistent and m takes value g on C and 0 otherwise FC;hðgÞ is just a special case of what Gerla calls the degree of
inconsistency of :hwith m, Incð:h; mÞ. Moreover results in Chapter 9 of [4] already give that in this case Incðm;:hÞ is the supre-
mum over all v1; . . . ;vN 2 C of thegN  T þ 1
Z  Tfor which T < Z, Z is minimal such that_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼Z
^
j2S
vj ?and T is minimal such that_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼T 
^
j2S
vj  hThe next result improves on Proposition 2(ii).
Corollary 9. Suppose g 2 ½0;mcðCÞ;Cg.fh and 0 6 s 6mcðCÞ  g. Then:
(i) If f > 0 then FC;hðgþ sÞP fþ sð1 fÞð1 gÞ1.
(ii) If g > 0 then FC;hðgþ sÞP minf1; sfg1g.
Proof. We may assume that f ¼ FC;hðgÞ since increasing f only improves the stated conclusions. In this case part (i) follows
by noticing that for arguments between g and mcðCÞ the graph of FC;h cannot dip below the straight line joining hg; fi and
h1;1i (notice that by Proposition 1(i) and Proposition 2(i) FC;hð1Þ ¼ 1).
If 2h part (ii) similarly follows by noting that by Proposition 1(iv) FC;hð0Þ ¼ 0 so for arguments between g and mcðCÞ the
graph of FC;h cannot dip below the straight line passing through h0;0i and hg; fi. On the other hand if  h then FC;h just takes
constant value 1 so the conclusion is trivially true. h
We now show the converse to Theorem 8, namely that any function satisfying the properties of FC;h proved in Theorem 8
is in fact of the form FC;h for some C; h (in some ﬁnite language). The next lemma is key to showing this.
Lemma 10. Given C1;C2; h1; h2 there are C; h (possibly on a ﬁnite extension of the language of C1;C2, etc.) such thatFC;hðxÞ ¼maxfFC1 ;h1 ðxÞ; FC2 ;h2 ðxÞgProof. We may assume that Ci# SLi and hi 2 SLi, for i ¼ 1;2, where L1 ¼ fp1; . . . ; png and L2 ¼ fq1; . . . ; qmg are disjoint lan-
guages with atoms fa1; . . . ;a2ng and fb1; . . . ; b2mg, respectively. Let
L ¼ L1 [ L2 and set C ¼ C1 [ C2# SL and h ¼ h1 _ h2 2 SL.
First note that by the language invariance of g.f if w is a probability function on L such that wðCÞP g then
wðh1ÞP FC1;h1 ðgÞ and wðh2ÞP FC2 ;h2 ðgÞ, so certainlywðhÞPmaxfFC1 ;h1 ðgÞ; FC2 ;h2 ðgÞgThus it only remains to show that there is some probability function w which takes exactly this value.
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and let wi; i ¼ 1;2, be a probability function on Li such that wiðCiÞP g, wiðhiÞ ¼ FCi ;hi ðgÞ. We deﬁne a ﬁnite sequence of prob-
ability functions wr on L such that for each rwrðaiÞ ¼ w1ðaiÞ for i ¼ 1; . . . ;2n;
wrðbiÞ ¼ w2ðbjÞ for j ¼ 1; . . . ;2m
ð16Þso in consequencewrðhiÞ ¼ FCi ;hi ðgÞ
for i ¼ 1;2, and such that for the ﬁnal wr in this sequencewrðhÞ ¼ wrðh1Þ
equivalentlywrðai ^ bjÞ ¼ 0 whenever ai2h1; bj  h2 ð17ÞTo start with setw0ðai ^ bjÞ ¼ w1ðaiÞ w2ðbjÞ
Now suppose we have successfully constructed wr . If (17) holds for this wr then we are done. Otherwise take the atoms
ai ^ bj with wrðai ^ bjÞ > 0, bj  h2;ai2h1. In this case we can ﬁnd an atom ap ^ bq with wrðap ^ bqÞ > 0;ap  h1, bq2h2. Such
an atom of L must exist since if not thenwrðh2Þ ¼
X
t
wrðait ^ bjt Þ þ
X
s
wrðais ^ bjs Þand X
wrðh1Þ ¼
t
wrðait ^ bjt Þfor t; s such that bjt  h2, ait  h1; bjs  h2, ais2h1. But then
FC2 ;h2 ðgÞ ¼ wrðh2Þ > wrðh1Þ ¼ FC1 ;h1 ðgÞcontradiction.
Now deﬁne wrþ1 as follows, for i; j; p and q as above:wrþ1ðai ^ bjÞ ¼ wrðai ^ bjÞ minfwrðai ^ bjÞ;wrðap ^ bqÞg
wrþ1ðai ^ bqÞ ¼ wrðai ^ bqÞ þminfwrðai ^ bjÞ;wrðap ^ bqÞg
wrþ1ðap ^ bjÞ ¼ wrðap ^ bjÞ þminfwrðai ^ bjÞ;wrðap ^ bqÞg
wrþ1ðap ^ bqÞ ¼ wrðap ^ bqÞ minfwrðai ^ bjÞ;wrðap ^ bqÞgandwrþ1 agreeing withwr on all other atoms of L. Then again we have (16) holding forwrþ1 in place ofwr and compared with
wr the probability function wrþ1 gives non-zero probability to strictly fewer atoms ai ^ bj with either bj  h2 and ai2h1 or
with ai  h1 and bj2h2. Clearly then this process eventually terminates at the required probability function. h
We now prove the converse to Theorem 8, that any such function satisfying the conditions proved of FC;h in that theorem
is in fact of the form FC;h for some C; h. This is clear for the functions which are identically 0 or 1 so we now drop them from
consideration in the next result.
Theorem 11. Let r 2 ½0;1 \Q and let F be any function such that
(i) Fð0Þ ¼ 0; Fð1Þ ¼ 1; F is increasing.
(ii) On [0, r] F is continuous and convex and made up of a ﬁnite set of straight line segments q1xþ q2 with q1; q2 2 Q and
q1 P 1 q2 P 1.
(iii) On ðr;1 FðxÞ  1.
Then there are C; h such that F ¼ FC;h on ½0;1.Proof. In view of Lemma 10 it is enough to show
(A) If 0 6 r < 1; r 2 Q, then there are C# SL and h 2 SL, for some ﬁnite language L, such thatFC;hðxÞ ¼
0 for 0 6 x 6 r
1 for r < x 6 1

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0 for 0 6 x 6 q2=q1
q1xþ q2 for  q2=q1 6 x 6 ð1 q2Þ=q1
1 for ð1 q2Þ=q1 6 x 6 1
8><
>:To show (A) just take h to be a contradiction and C ¼ fhg if r ¼ 0. Otherwise for r ¼ s=t > 0; s; t 2 N, take L large enough and
set4 CC ¼
_
i2S
aijS# f1; . . . ; tg; jSj ¼ s
( )If the probability functionw gives C its maximum consistency then so does any permutation of w (when identifyingwwith a
vector in D2l ) which is ﬁxed on coordinates wðakÞ for k > t, and in turn so does the average over these permutations. Hence
we see that C attains its maximum consistency of s=t for the probability function which gives each ai for i ¼ 1; . . . ; t prob-
ability 1=t.
To show (B) let q2=q1 ¼ r=t; ð1 q2Þ=q1 ¼ s=t where r; s; t 2 N. By the conditions on q1; q2;0 6 r=t 6 s=t 6 1. Again let L
be large and seth ¼
_2t
j¼tþ1
ajandC ¼
_
i2S
ai _
_
j2T
ajjS# f1; . . . ; tg; jSj ¼ r; T# ft þ 1; . . . ;2tg; jTj ¼ s
( )Then if wðaiÞ ¼ 1=t for i ¼ 1; . . . ; t;wðCÞ ¼ r=t and wðhÞ ¼ 0, so FC;hðr=tÞ ¼ 0. Now suppose that r=t 6 g < s=t FC;hðgÞ ¼ h < 1
and let w be the probability attaining such supremum. As above we can assume that wðaiÞ has constant value, a say, for
i ¼ 1; . . . ; t and constant value, b say, for i ¼ t þ 1; . . . ;2t and that all the probability is assigned to the ai for i 6 2t (otherwise
assign what is left evenly to the ai for i 6 t). Then h ¼ tb; g ¼ sbþ ra; taþ tb ¼ 1 so h ¼ r=t þ ð1 s=tÞg ¼ q1g þ q2. From this
and the properties of FC;h shown in Theorem 8 part (B) follows. h
At this point we ﬁnally return to complete the proof of Theorem 6 in the case when one or both of g; f are irrational.
Proof of Theorem 6 continued.We ﬁrst consider the case where g is irrational and f rational. In this case if Cg.f/ then by
Theorem 8 FC;/ðxÞ ¼ q1xþ q2 for some q1; q2 2 Q for all x in some open non-empty neighborhood ðg ;gþ Þ. Since q1gþ q2
is irrational (q1–0 otherwise f ¼ 0) it must be that q1gþ q2 > f so there are r1; r2 2 Q such that r1 < g; r2 > f; q1r1 þ q2 > r2.
Taking r1 within  of g then FC;/ðr1Þ > r2 so there is some v1; . . . ;vN 2 C and Z; T such that Tð1 r2Þ 6 r1N  r2Z þ 1; T < Z and_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼Z
^
j2S
vj ?; ð18Þ
_
S# f1;...;Ng
jSj¼T
^
j2S
vj  / ð19ÞBut thenTð1 fÞ 6 gN  fZ þ 1 ð20Þ
as required.
Conversely if we have v1; . . . ;vN 2 C and Z; T satisfying (18)–(20) then again there must be r1 < g; r2 > f such that
Tð1 r2Þ 6 r1N  r2Z þ 1Thus by the two rational case already proved Cr1.r2/.
The case where g 2 Q; f R Q is proved similarly. Finally suppose that g; f are both irrational. If Cg.f/ and
FC;/ðgÞ ¼ q1gþ q2 > f then just as in the previous case we can show there are vi, etc. to give the required propositional equiv-
alent. So suppose FC;/ðgÞ ¼ q1gþ q2 ¼ f. In this case FC;/ðxÞ ¼ q1xþ q2 for x in some non-empty open neighborhood
ðg ;gþ Þ since by Theorem 8 changes of slope can only happen at rational points. Pick r1 in this interval and set
r2 ¼ q1r1 þ q2. Then by the two rational case there are some v1; . . . ;vN 2 C and Z; T such that T < Z and
Tð1 r2Þ 6 r1N  r2Z þ 1, etc. Indeed we must have equality here, otherwise we could increase r2 with r1 ﬁxed and sohave chosen this large C to make the construction easier to understand. There are much smaller choices, see for example [14].
1162 J.B. Paris et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 1151–1163(using the two rational case) show that FC;/ðr1Þ > r2. It must be the case that the two lines Tð1 yÞ ¼ xN  yZ þ 1 and
y ¼ q1xþ q2 are the same, otherwise the former would go above the latter at a rational point in the interval
ðg ;gþ Þ, contradicting the proven completeness result in the rational case. Hence this provides the required equiva-
lent to Cg.f/.
Finally in the other direction, in the case g; f R Q, suppose that we have the required T; Z;v1; . . . ;vN satisfying (18)–(20).
Then for rational r1 close to g and r2 6 ðr1N  T þ 1Þ=ðZ  TÞ; r2 close to f these same v1; . . . ;vN;/ and Z; T give Cr1.r2/. Since
r1; r2 can be made arbitrarily close to g; f respectively we can conclude by Proposition 4 that Cg.f/, as required. h6. A ‘Real World’ example
A dedicated armchair naturalist of many years sitting has acquired, and remembered, the following facts concerning the
world’s largest amphibian:
 It can kill a chicken and comes from Japan.
 It is not the Japanese salamander but it can kill a chicken.
 It is a salamander and if it is not a chicken killer then it must be the Japanese salamander.
Taking p to stand for ‘can kill a chicken’, q to stand for ‘Japanese’ and r to stand for ‘salamander’ these can be formalized as:5 Of c
threshop ^ q; :ðq ^ rÞ ^ p; r ^ ð:p! ðr ^ qÞÞ
Denoting this set by C we ﬁnd that the maximal consistency, mcðCÞ, of C is 2/3, being given by the probability function
which gives each of the atoms p ^ q ^ r; p ^ q ^ :r; p ^ :q ^ r probability 1/3. From this it follows thatC2=3.2=3p ^ r:
In other words if our naturalist set his/her primary threshold at 2/3 then on the basis of just this knowledge C s/he should be
willing to acceptIt’s a chicken killing salamanderat this same threshold.
On the other hand if the naturalist felt that his/her recall was so faulty that a higher secondary threshold was required
before actually making any public assertion based on it then setting the threshold at its highest possible value of 1 would
giveC2=3.1p ^ ðq _ rÞ:
In other words, with this more stringent demand in place the naturalist should still be happy to assert that the world’s larg-
est amphibian isa chicken killer and either Japanese or a salamander:In the other direction lowering the secondary threshold sufﬁciently would in this case enable the naturalist to make rather
stronger assertions, but at the same time risk being unacceptably inconsistent. For exampleC2=3.1=3r;:r
so at threshold 1/3 s/he would be directly asserting both the statement that it is a salamander and the statement that it is not
a salamander.5
7. Conclusion
We have introduced and investigated a parameterized propositional consequence relation, g.f, which we have argued is
appropriate for making acceptable inferences in the case of an agent’s subjective, and possibly inconsistent, knowledge
base.Acknowledgement
We would like to thank the referees for their suggested improvements.ourse this is not the same as asserting the single statement that ‘it is a salamander and it is not a salamander’, that, i.e. r ^ :r, could only be accepted at
ld 0.
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